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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The status of (video) games in copyright law remains the subject of debate. Whether it 
be long-standing issues of whether to treat games as software, audiovisual works or both, or 
newer issues such as the impact of casual gaming and the app market, there are recurring 
issues of the ‘fit’ between copyright law and games. Moreover, a range of recent decisions of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) demonstrate the impact of the resolution 
of some of these theoretical issues for the balance of power between developers, 
manufacturers and users (players). 
As part of a UK-based project on games, transmedia and the law,1 we2 reviewed 
legislation and cases (in the UK, supplemented by material from the US and 
Commonwealth), considered critical perspectives on the current law, met with developers3 
and carried out a survey of gamers. In this chapter, I will outline, drawn from this evidence, 
three models of copyright for games: the general model, the game-specific model, and the 
player rights model. None of these models are ideal but they can be used to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of different facets of the laws applicable in the sector, and to pick 
up Boyden’s important challenge (in his 2011 article ‘Games and Other Uncopyrightable 
Systems’4) to attend to the problems of games (including video games) for broader reasons: 
 
[G]ames exist at the boundary of intellectual property law. Focusing on the precise 
nature of games — and why they are not within the scope of copyright — helps us 
define where those boundaries are . . .5 
 
First, though, the general legal framework for copyright protection in respect of video 
games will be set out (Part II), followed by a review of critical perspectives and the evidence 
gathered for this project (Parts III and IV). 
 
II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR COPYRIGHT AND GAMES 
 
A. General principles and conceptual issues 
 
European Union copyright law operates through a number of Directives. These 
measures are transposed into the national law of member states according to their own legal 
                                                            
* Reader in Law, Newcastle University. 
1 This work was supported by the RCUK funded Centre for Copyright and New Business Models in the Creative 
Economy (CREATe), AHRC Grant Number AH/K000179/1. 
2 The author (as principal investigator), with Dr Keith M Johnston and Dr Tom Phillips. 
3 The aspects of the workshop with developers relevant to this article are discussed in more detail in Tom 
Phillips, ‘“Don’t Clone My Indie Game, Bro”: Informal Cultures of Videogame Regulation in the Independent 
Sector’ (2015) 24(2) Cultural Trends 143. 
4 Bruce Boyden, ‘Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems’ (2011) 18 George Mason Law Review 439. 
5 ibid 441. 
systems, but are binding as to the outcome — thus ‘harmonising’ the law in part. EU 
members are also parties to the World Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’) treaties 
on copyright law, and the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’).6 
However, in the case of games, there are three particular areas where the application 
of the broad principles of contemporary copyright law requires further discussion. These 
questions relate to the Software Directive,7 the definition of works protected by copyright 
law, and the interaction between copyright law and contract law. 
The first two questions are closely connected. There are two relevant regimes in the 
EU. One operates at a general level — the Information Society Directive8 and, broadly, prior 
member state provisions including those adopted in the context of Berne and TRIPS.9 The 
other deals specifically with computer programs, again reflecting international instruments — 
the Software Directive10 — and requires the protection of computer programs as literary 
works, subject to some specific provisions and exceptions. In some jurisdictions, often 
following the lead of the US, computer programs are a type of literary work but are not 
treated in as distinctive a fashion (although some differences can still be detected with regard 
to exceptions).11 The application of the two Directives to the video games sector has long 
been a source of curiosity. This takes place in the context of well-recognised ‘inconsistencies 
and uncertainties’12 between the Directives. 
The second question arises because ‘games’ are not mentioned in the international 
treaties. As a result, protection will depend on the treatment of a game as a type of protected 
work (eg, film, literary) and/or of components of a game as a protected work (eg, artistic). 
A 2013 report for WIPO found that there were two dominant approaches to the 
copyright status of video games: as predominantly computer programs (a type of literary 
work under the international treaties, as discussed above) or as mixed works.13 The latter 
often includes games as a type of film,14 as has been the case to some extent in Australia15 
and potentially in New Zealand,16 although sometimes this has been held to offer protection 
                                                            
6 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 321 (1999), 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), 
entered into force 1 January 1995. 
7 Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ L111/16 
(codifying Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs) 
(‘Software Directive’). 
8 Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10 (‘Information Society Directive’). 
9 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9 1886 (Paris, 4 May 1896), 
828 UNTS 221, entered into force 5 December 1887, as revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967; TRIPS (n 6). 
10 Software Directive (n 7). 
11 John S McKeown, Canadian Intellectual Property Law and Strategy (Oxford University Press 2010) 186, 301 
(discussing Copyright Act (Canada), RSC 1985, c C-42, s 30.6; Benedict Atkinson, The True History of 
Copyright: The Australian Experience 1905–2005 (Sydney University Press 2007) 381 (discussing the 
significance of statutory changes regarding software in Australian law in 1984, closely following the position in 
US law). 
12 Marie-Christine Janssens, ‘The Software Directive’ in Irini A Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans (eds), EU 
Copyright Law: A Commentary (Edward Elgar 2014) [5.03]. 
13 Andy Ramos and others, The Legal Status of Video Games: Comparative Analysis in National Approaches 
(World Intellectual Property Organisation 2013) [14]. 
14 Paul Gottlich, ‘Online Games From the Standpoint of Media and Copyright Law’ (2007) 6 IRIS Plus 58–9. 
15 Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 8; Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment (2005) 224 CLR 193 [80-100]. 
16 Susy Frankel, Intellectual Property in New Zealand (LexisNexis 2011) 791 (arguing that Galaxy (n 15) was 
an interpretation of an Australian provision that was narrower in scope than its New Zealand equivalent). 
only to video-style material (‘attract mode’ in arcade terms,17 or cutscenes in contemporary 
games). In any event, protection of film in the UK is based on copying a recording and not 
‘reshooting,18 and is therefore of limited value in some situations (especially non-literal 
copying, as discussed below). Arguments to use the law on dramatic works are also 
encountered, but these have problems in the requirement for unity.19 In some countries, video 
games are treated as audiovisual works. This was a particular feature of a line of disputes 
regarding arcade games under US law in the 1980s, although typically this was in addition to 
rather than instead of the protection of software.20 
The CJEU recently addressed the status of games in its decision in Nintendo Co Ltd v 
PC Box Srl,21 a preliminary reference regarding the law on technological protection measures 
(‘TPMs’). In order to ascertain whether the provisions of the Information Society Directive or 
Software Directive were applicable, the court found it necessary to define games in more 
detail. It found that games ‘constitute complex matter comprising not only a computer 
program but also graphic and sound elements, which, although encrypted in computer 
language, have a unique creative value which cannot be reduced to that encryption’.22 
Consequently, when graphics and sounds are part of the originality of a game, ‘they are 
protected, together with the entire work, by copyright in the context of the system established 
by [the Information Society Directive]’.23 This was a surprising finding, especially in light of 
the CJEU’s recognition of the specialised nature of software copyright in UsedSoft GmbH v 
Oracle International Corp.24 Nonetheless, the significance of other creative works (eg, 
licensed or newly composed music) within games has been highlighted in leading accounts of 
the industry,25 including the degree to which technological developments (eg, the 
development of the Sony PlayStation) has underlined the importance of music, art and multi-
disciplinary creative teams. 
A third issue is that some alleged infringements of copyright law in respect of games 
may be better understood as breaches of contract. This point is underdeveloped in Europe.26 
                                                            
17 Stanley Lai, The Copyright Protection of Computer Software in the United Kingdom (Hart Publishing 2000) 
89. 
18 Simon Stokes, Art and Copyright (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 180; Norowzian v Arks [1998] FSR 394 
(Ch). 
19 David Booton and Angus MacCulloch, ‘Liability for the Circumvention of Technological Protection 
Measures Applied to Videogames: Lessons From the United Kingdom’s Experience’ (2012) 3 Journal of 
Business Law 165, 176. 
20 For instance, the registration of Scramble as an audiovisual work (and not as a computer program) was 
unsuccessfully challenged on the grounds that fixation was not present and that the deposited videotape was 
only applicable to that version: see Stern Electronics, Inc v Kaufman, 669 F 2d 852 (2d Cir 1982). Another 
unsuccessful argument was that failure to register a program defeated a claim; the court responded that the game 
(Asteroids) was copyrightable as an audiovisual work and as a motion picture, with the circuit board (program) 
being the medium of fixation: see Atari, Inc v Amusement World, Inc, 547 F Supp 222 (D Md 1981). In cases 
from the same era (Williams Electronics, Inc v Artic International, Inc, 685 F 2d 870 (3d Cir 1982); Midway 
Manufacturing Co v Strohon, 564 F Supp 741 (ND Ill 1983)), it was clear that developers were pursuing a dual 
strategy of registering both the audiovisual work (in the case of Williams, two works — one for attract mode and 
one for play mode) and the program. In both cases literal copying of code was found, which on the facts would 
have had limited relevance to a claim of infringement focused on the audiovisual work alone. 
21 Case C-355/12 Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl [2014] OJ C93/8. 
22 ibid [23]. 
23 ibid. 
24 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp [2012] OJ C287/10. 
25 James Newman, Videogames (2nd edn, Routledge 2013) 33; Randy Nichols, The Video Game Business 
(British Film Institute 2014) 128–30. 
26 It has been suggested that the Unfair Contract Terms Directive will often apply (in respect of consumers and 
mass-market licences), and that EU copyright law recognises the role of contracts through the (so far limited) 
provisions regarding the inapplicability of certain contractual provisions purporting to exclude user rights in the 
The MDY Industries v Blizzard Entertainment, Inc decision in the US27 (on the legal status of 
Glider in World of Warcraft) holds that certain infringements are actionable as a breach of 
contract rather than a breach of copyright. This is important because — for example — it 
affects the remedies available and who can be taken to court. 
These conceptual issues affect the treatment of three specific issues: second-hand 
sales, digital rights management and ‘cloning’. 
 
B. Second-hand sales 
 
The UsedSoft decision of the CJEU28 clarifies that the ‘exhaustion’ right in copyright 
law (in short, that a purchaser can resell without recourse to the original vendor) applies to 
downloaded software — including in some circumstances where the software has ostensibly 
been licensed rather than sold.29 However, both the doctrinal approach in PC Box and a 
recent German decision point towards some doubts on the applicability or effectiveness of the 
UsedSoft decision in relation to games, and specifically game business models;30 the limited 
relevance of exhaustion in the digital context under the Information Society Directive, as held 
in Allposters31, is also a limitation. Nonetheless, the broad principles appear to have survived 
low-level challenges and are beginning to be reflected in business practices in parts of the 
software industry,32 and there have also been cases instigated by resellers seeking 
(successfully in some situations) the annulment of clauses in software licensing agreements 
on UsedSoft and unfair competition grounds.33 The issue has also been controversial in the 
United States, where the application of the long-standing ‘first sale’ doctrine34 to new 
technologies has prompted discussion.35 
 
C. DRM 
 
Console manufacturers have brought a number of civil actions under UK law in 
respect of ‘modchipping’ and supported a smaller number of criminal prosecutions. These 
actions have been based on the transposed provisions of both the Software Directive and the 
Information Society Directive, which protect TPMs, including ‘digital rights management’ 
(‘DRM’). 
                                                            
Software Directive and Database Directive:  Lucie Guibault, ‘Relationship between copyright and contract law’ 
in Estelle Derclaye (ed), Research handbook on the future of EU copyright (Edward Elgar 2009) 528, 535. 
27 629 F 3d 928 (9th Cir 2010). 
28 UsedSoft (n 24). 
29 See generally Andrew Nicholson, ‘Old Habits Die Hard?: UsedSoft v Oracle’ (2013) 10(3) SCRIPTed 389 
(on the decision and its implications); Reto Hilty, ‘“Exhaustion” in the Digital Age’ (2015) Max Planck Institute 
for Innovation & Competition Research Paper 15-09 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2689518> accessed 2 January 
2016 (on the background to and context of the question of exhaustion, and the application of the decision to 
various formats). 
30 Martina Gillen, ‘DRM and Modchips: Time for the Court of Justice to do the “Right” Thing’ (2014) 11(3) 
SCRIPTed 229; Maša Savič, ‘The Legality of Resale of Digital Content After UsedSoft in Subsequent German 
and CJEU Case Law’ (2015) 37(7) European Intellectual Property Review 414, 419. 
31 Case C-419/13 Art & Allposters International v Stichting Pictoright [2015] OJ C107/6. The issue arises 
because of the reference to an ‘object’ in the Information Society Directive, as compared with ‘copy’ in the 
Software Directive. 
32 Robin Fry, ‘Reselling Software Licences’ (2015) 26 Computers & Law 19. 
33 Savič (n 30) 417. 
34 Bobbs-Merill v Straus 201 US 339 (1908); Copyright Act 1976 (US), s 109(a). 
35 Gregory Steirer, ‘The personal media collection in an era of connected viewing’ in Jennifer Holt and Kevin 
Sanson (eds), Connected viewing : selling, streaming, & sharing media in the digital era (Taylor & Francis 
2014). 
The distinction between the Directives (see Part II(A) above) is important for a 
number of reasons. In the UK and elsewhere, criminal sanctions are in place for non-software 
cases. There is also a different burden of proof in the Directives; compare the requirement 
that a device be ‘primarily designed’ for the purpose of circumvention under the Information 
Society Directive36 with the Software Directive’s reference to ‘sole intended purpose’.37 
Further exceptions are also in place under the Software Directive, in relation to reverse 
engineering, backup, and interoperability. Moreover, it is provided that the right to load and 
run a program (which would under the Directive be considered as within the exclusive rights 
of the author) may neither be prohibited by contract nor require specific authorisation, in 
respect of lawful use. In practice, console manufacturers have successfully emphasised the 
artistic elements of games (for example, specific works of art in the form of game graphics) 
in order to secure favourable decisions under the Information Society Directive. 
PC Box, already discussed in this chapter,38 was the first CJEU decision on DRM. In 
responding to the Italian Court’s preliminary reference, the CJEU specifically referred to 
proportionality as a limitation on the protection of the rights holder. Indeed, EU law will only 
protect TPMs against circumvention where the objective is to prevent infringing acts39 and 
where the circumvention device does not have a commercially significant other use.40 It seeks 
evidence of actual use of a device in breach of copyright (potentially a difficult issue)41 and 
requires consideration of the effectiveness of measures and the relative costs of different 
forms of protection (including less intrusive means). This calls into question earlier English 
decisions — for example, the finding in Nintendo Co Ltd v Playables Ltd that the cause of 
action is a tort of strict liability42 and that protection does not have to be totally effective.43 
However, in the specific case of the defendants PC Box, it appears as if the Italian 
Court still found in Nintendo’s favour because of the evidence presented on use and 
proportionality.44 Nintendo’s predictably ‘delighted’45 response links the Italian finding to 
decisions elsewhere (including the UK),46 but the space opened up by the CJEU for a more 
detailed consideration of use and proportionality casts some doubt on Nintendo’s confidence, 
given that the earlier decisions applied demonstrably less intensive tests. Favale argued 
(shortly after the CJEU had spoken) that some of the emerging requirements for making 
TPMs enforceable under EU law (ie, that there not be a less intrusive way to achieve 
protection, and that infringement be demonstrated) are ‘so difficult to prove that this might 
disrupt the implementation of DRM in practice (to the joy of users’ rights organisations)’.47 
However, she also criticises how the court has approached the topic of user rights. 
 
D. Cloning 
                                                            
36 Information Society Directive (n 8) art 6. 
37 Software Directive (n 7) art 7. See discussion in  Jon Bing, ‘Copyright protection of computer programs’ in 
Estelle Derclaye (ed), Research handbook on the future of EU copyright (Edward Elgar 2009) 424. 
38 PC Box (n 21). 
39 ibid [31]. 
40 ibid [30] 
41 Gareth Dickson, ‘Game Over for Excessive TPM?’ (2014) 24 Computers & Law 5, 7. 
42 [2010] EWHC 1932, [2010] FSR 36 [19] (based on Sony v Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch)). 
43 Playables (n 42) [17]. 
44 Mark Walton, ‘Nintendo Wins Court Ruling Against Modchips and Homebrew Software’ (Ars Technica UK, 
17 November 2015) <http://arstechnica.co.uk/gaming/2015/11/italian-court-rules-modchips-are-primarily-used-
to-play-pirated-games/> accessed 5 January 2016. 
45 Nintendo, ‘Nintendo Wins Important Court Ruling to Protect the Security in Its Consoles’ (2015) 
<https://ap.nintendo.com/_pdf/news/283613675.pdf> accessed 5 January 2016. 
46 ibid. 
47 Marcella Favale, ‘A Wii Too Stretched? The ECJ Extends to Game Consoles the Protection of DRM — on 
Tough Conditions’ (2015) 37(2) European Intellectual Property Review 101, 106. 
 
In our project, we approached cloning as being ‘the intentional copying of sets of 
game mechanics, with slight alterations to art and design in order to capitalise on a previous 
games’ success’.48 The term has become particularly visible in discussion of online and 
casual games in recent years. Given that platforms such as app stores have ‘discoverability’ 
as a concern,49 and the cost of developing casual games is argued to be potentially much 
lower than conventionally understood in the sector,50 the ease with which clones can draw 
users (and money) away from successful games (even for a short period) prompts debate. 
The issue of what courts called ‘knock-offs’ emerged in US courts during the arcade 
games boom of the 1980s51 and became a significant part of the sector quite rapidly.52 In a 
series of cases, developers of successful games repeatedly brought claims of infringement 
against other developers. These cases required courts to develop copyright law doctrines — 
in particular the idea/expression dichotomy — and to apply them to the arcade games sector. 
In Atari, Inc v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp,53 the defendant 
(manufacturer of the Magnavox Odyssey) prevailed on a range of arguments regarding the 
lack of protection for various aspects of Atari’s Pac-Man (ranging from the score table to the 
exits and dots), but was still found to have infringed in particular aspects — essentially the 
‘characters’ (gobblers) appearing in both games. Conversely, the two US copyright concepts 
of merger and scènes à faire were significant to a finding of no infringement in a dispute over 
two similar karate games;54 the use of dissimilar backgrounds and the dual constraints of the 
nature of karate and the limitations of contemporary computers supported the arguments of 
the defendants. 
The leading English authority on this topic is more recent, although still concerns 
arcade games. In Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd,55 a game similar to one 
already on the market was found not to breach the copyright of the developer of the earlier 
game. The court found that no code had been copied and the similarity was essentially one of 
gameplay or the game mechanics. The court seems to close the door to protecting gameplay. 
Nova (creator of the game Pocket Money) alleged Mazooma (creator of Jackpot Pool) 
and Bell Fruit (creator of Trick Shot) infringed copyright. Similarities included the cue and 
power meter. The court drew out a precedent in Navitaire, Inc v EasyJet Airline Co 
(regarding the development of similarly functioning new booking software without access to 
code)56 and applied it to games. Lord Justice Jacobs said that finding infringement would 
mean ‘copyright would become an instrument of oppression rather than the incentive for 
creation which it is intended to be’.57 This is consistent with and similar in rhetorical terms to 
                                                            
48 Phillips (n 3). 
49 Newman (n 25) 35. 
50 Claudio Feijoó, ‘An Exploration of the Mobile Gaming Ecosystem From Developers’ Perspective’ in Peter 
Zackariasson and Timothy Wilson (eds), The Video Game Industry: Formation, Present State, and Future 
(Routledge 2012) 87. 
51 Martin Campbell-Kelly, From airline reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog : a history of the software industry 
(MIT Press 2003)273-4. 
52 Writing in 2000, Lai described cloning as a whole segment of the software industry, comprising those 
companies engaged in the ‘production of less expensive look-alike and work-alike versions of popular 
software’: see Lai (n 17) 57. 
53 672 F 2d 607 (7th Cir 1982). 
54 Data East USA, Inc v Epyx, Inc, 862 F 2d 204 (9th Cir 1988).  
55 [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch), affd [2007] EWCA Civ 219, [2007] ECDR 6. 
56 Navitaire, Inc v EasyJet Airline Co [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch) (discussed in Nova Productions (HC) (n 55) 
[130]–[134] and Nova Productions (CA) (n 55) [45]–[48]). It was perhaps appropriate that the earlier case 
concerned airline reservation software and was applied in a games case; Campbell-Kelly used airline software 
and video games as the beginning and the end of his study of the software industry: Campbell-Kelly (n 51). 
57 Nova Productions (CA) (n 55) [55]. 
the reluctance of UK law to recognise copyright in works such as TV ‘formats’.58 A broadly 
similar decision (regarding software rather than games), summarising the development of the 
law on non-literal copying and doctrines (especially merger) outside the US, was recently 
reached by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand.59 
At the European level, it is clear that a graphical user interface can be protected by 
copyright but not if it is ‘differentiated only by (its) technical function’ — a significant 
limitation.60 The CJEU’s decision in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd61 expresses 
some scepticism regarding the protection of functionality under copyright law; the question 
arises because interfaces themselves are not protected, but the expression of the interface in 
computer code could plausibly be. 
The most recent detailed treatment of ‘cloning’ by courts requires a return to the 
United States, and a 2012 district court decision regarding an iPhone app and a very familiar 
game. In Tetris Holding LLC v Xio Interactive, Inc,62 Xio argued that it had ‘meticulously 
copied only non-protected elements’63 — understandable in light of Tetris’s wide range of 
licensing activities and vigorous defence against infringement. It took legal advice before the 
launch (not denying that the very purpose was to do something similar to Tetris while staying 
within the law) and resisted a DMCA takedown notice, which gave rise to the action. In 
court, it relied upon merger and scènes à faire, as well as broader contentions on games, 
monopoly and patent overlap. However, Tetris prevailed, with the court distinguishing the 
‘purely fanciful’ nature of Tetris from the cases on karate and golf (which came with existing 
rules and assumptions),64 proposing that scènes à faire was broadly irrelevant because of the 
lack of stock images, and highlighting how Xio could have used different shapes, 
movements, dimensions, etc.65 It treated the pieces (which Xio called minos, reflecting the 
(mathematical) tetromino, or what Tetris called tetriminos) akin to the ‘characters’ in the 
earlier Pac-Man cases. 
In our workshop, developers told us how the availability of clones within app stores 
was a significant source of concern and anger within the industry. However, identifying a 
suitable legal response was more difficult. We noted clear hostility to extending legal 
protection against cloning — perhaps influenced by the suspicion of the damage that the use 
and abuse of patents is said to have done in some fields (eg, mobile phone hardware) and how 
its application to software was resisted by many, especially in Europe. As one participant told 
                                                            
58 Green v Broadcasting Corp of New Zealand [1989] UKPC 26 (PC). See further Sukhpreet Singh, ‘The 
Protection of Television Formats: Intellectual Property and Market-Based Strategies’ (PhD thesis, Bournemouth 
University 2010). 
59 Karum Group LLC v Fisher and Paykel Financial Services [2014] 3 NZLR 421. For discussion of the close 
links between older US authorities (for example, the abstraction-filtration-comparison test in Computer 
Associates v Altai, 982 F 2d 693 (2d Cir 1992)) and recent CJEU, UK and New Zealand decisions, and an 
argument that non-literal copying is as a result rarely found, see Ken Moon, ‘Another Nail in the Coffin for 
Non-literal Software Copyright Infringement?’ (2015) 10(12) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 
921. Moon also suggests (at 926) that TRIPS (n 6) has been a factor in redirecting UK and New Zealand law 
towards a narrower approach to whether given elements of software are capable of copyright protection. 
60 Case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace — Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] 
OJ C63/8. See also Stokes (n 18) 111 (in general); Janssens (n 12) [5.15] (suggesting that this equated to the US 
‘merger doctrine’); Moon (n 59) 926 (describing the CJEU’s approach as merger-like but underpinned by 
originality rather than the idea/expression dichotomy). 
61 Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2012] OJ C 174/5. 
62 863 F Supp 2d 394 (D NJ 2012). 
63 ibid 396. 
64 ibid 408. 
65 ibid 411. 
us, ‘The idea of a legal institute outside of videogames to decide whether something is too 
close to something or not sounds awful’.66 
Indeed, the courts that have dealt with cases of this nature have had to face a number 
of challenges. In Data East USA, Inc v Epyx, Inc, the judges did not play the game, although 
they had access to screenshots.67 In Nova Productions, the judge at first instance played the 
games and saw videos; screenshots were reproduced in an annex to the decision.68 In Tetris, 
the record shows that the judge relied on YouTube videos of gameplay, along with 
screenshots and written material.69 Interesting and contestable assumptions are also made 
about player behaviour. Most alarmingly, the court in Atari, Inc v North American Philips 
Consumer Electronics Corp held that video games, ‘unlike an artist’s painting or even other 
audiovisual works, appeal to an audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their 
concern about more subtle differences in artistic expression’.70 
 
III. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
A number of authors specifically address the distinctive features of the games industry 
in relation to intellectual property. Notably, reviewing such work highlights concerns of 
‘underprotection’ as well as ‘overprotection’. For instance, inadequacies of the current 
framework are highlighted in Lee’s work, where she tentatively suggests that ‘gameplay’ 
should be protected against copying,71 which despite its importance to the identity and 
experience of games, is one of the less well-protected aspects of the game under IP law. On 
the other hand, Booton and MacCulloch criticise the use of TPMs (including DRM) in the 
game sector. Although TPMs are justified by the industry as an anti-infringement measure, 
they respond that the way in which they are used (with judicial approval) constituted the 
protection of dominant business models in the form of a de facto ‘console manufacturers’ 
right’.72 They contend that manufacturers were never the intended beneficiaries of the TPM 
provisions of copyright law. The dependence of manufacturers on royalty income from 
developers has been noted by others,73 as has how TPMs support the business model of one-
off, relatively high charges for games,74 and the mutual dependence between developers and 
manufacturers in the console sector.75 One might therefore think that the emergence of new 
platforms for gaming presents an opportunity,76 although the control exercised by some new 
players (Apple in particular) is not without its own problems.77 
                                                            
66 Phillips (n 3). 
67 See Data East (n 54). 
68 See Nova Productions (HC) (n 55). 
69 See Tetris (n 62). 
70 Atari, Inc v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp (n 53) [44]. 
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A second theme in academic literature is the relationship between the 
developer/provider of a game and the user, with a particular focus on the role of copyright 
(and other legal doctrines) in framing and underpinning this relationship. For instance, 
copyright is one of the doctrines that require or justify the end user license agreement, and 
provides a structure for control and ownership in relation to in-world creativity. Yet user 
rights can often be marginal; Roquilly’s study found that 85 per cent of major virtual worlds 
protect the manager’s right to delete content (including user-produced content) at any time 
without reason, although there was more diversity on whether users could own certain 
creations.78 Moreover, current EU law is unclear on whether certain contractual restrictions 
(for instance, those restricting freedom of expression) are lawful.79 Clarke argues that Sony, 
as the ‘makers’ of the former online game Star Wars Galaxies, performed three functions: 
worldmakers, curators and ‘toykeepers’. Although Clarke’s concerns are not legal, 
‘respecting the rules of intellectual property ownership’ is cited under the third heading, and 
indeed the first two functions carry legally salient meanings of regulation and the exercise of 
discretion. He also compares the approach taken in respect of Star Wars Galaxies (by Sony) 
with what he terms ‘notoriously litigious IP owners’ who crack down on unauthorised or 
unforeseen uses.80 
Even this brief account demonstrates that the question is more complex than one of 
‘high’ and ‘low’ protection. Instead, the more interesting questions are those of alignment 
between the level of protection and the impact of protecting specific things. In my own work 
in 2014, I suggested that the growing significance of consumer law within the games sector, 
coupled with the uneven impact of intellectual property law, meant that there was no clear 
relationship between (perceived) needs for protection and the strength of available legal 
remedies.81 For instance, players are gaining new and often very powerful legal remedies 
based on the conventional concepts of consumer law (as they are adapted for digital content), 
but have very little recourse against a developer, especially in relation to their own in-world 
creations. Developers have little hope of addressing certain cloning issues and struggle to 
gain access to some platforms, but can in theory benefit from strong protection against 
consumer infringement (copying, downloading, etc). 
 
IV. PLAYER SURVEY 
 
We also carried out an online survey, directed at gamers,82 which received 246 
responses. Participants were invited to make recommendations on changes to ‘the way 
copyright operates in relation to the video game industry’. These are not intended to be 
statistically significant or representative, but to highlight game-specific perceptions of IP law, 
and are used in this chapter as one type of evidence in support of the major models outlined 
in Part V. 
By far, the most common recommendation related to DRM. Comments included: 
 
1) Many DRM/copy protection systems unfairly penalize ordinary users in the hope of 
inconveniencing hardcore software pirates (light gamer, male, 26–35, Europe). 
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2) Remove DRM, as they only punish people trying to buy a game (heavy gamer, male, 
18–25, North America). 
3) DRM hurts the experience of gamers who purchase their games legitimately. It should 
be abolished entirely (light gamer, male, 18–25, North America). 
4) Quit making bad DRM. I understand and respect companies trying to make a profit, 
but bad DRM has screwed my system up before. Use Steam as an example of 
effective DRM (moderate gamer, female, 36–45, North America). 
5) DRM needs to be handled with care in order to ensure fairness. Allowing limited 
sharing (ie, 1 game = 2 or 3 simultaneous users) might reduce piracy and DRM 
circumvention. A strategy is needed whereby gamers perceive generosity rather than 
resent restrictions (moderate gamer, male, 26–35, North America). 
6) Most of my opinions on copyright are not necessarily restricted to the video game 
industry. That said, it needs to get away from punishing people who legally pay for 
their games with all of these punitive DRM mechanisms (heavy gamer, male, 26–35, 
North America). 
 
A second issue was the related concept of outright ownership. There were calls to 
‘stop treating games as immaterial objects — when I've bought a game, I want to be able to 
continue to play it’ (heavy gamer, male, 36–45, Europe), and to ‘[give] control back to the 
customer — if you paid for something, you own it and can do as you please with it’ 
(moderate gamer, male, 18–25, Europe). Others support used games (moderate gamer, 
female, 26–35, North America) or more consumer rights (heavy gamer, female, 26–35, 
Europe) — both issues being familiar in the academic literature discussed in Part III of this 
chapter. 
Views on ‘cloning’ were mixed. While a number of respondents called for greater 
attention to cloning and better legal remedies for those affected, there was a high level of 
criticism of ‘word-based’ legal actions (appearing to refer to controversies in trade mark law 
— for example, ‘candy’ cases).83 
 
V. MODELS 
 
Having reviewed a range of perspectives on games and the law, it becomes apparent 
that there are a number of broad approaches to the scope of protection and the work that the 
law is being expected to do. These approaches can be grouped into three ‘models’ or sets of 
assumptions. Doing so allows for common principles to be identified and the cumulative 
impact of judicial decisions and industry practices to be appreciated. 
 
A. General 
 
The first model is one that does not attribute special significance to games, and in 
particular acknowledges that the label ‘game’ is a container for a number of facets of 
copyright. As far back as 1982, Sugar argued that although imitations would constitute 
infringement of artistic and musical works, a game should (in policy terms) be treated as a 
film and the software instructions as a script.84 However, the twin-track Software Directive 
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and Information Society Directive85 has meant that, if games are software, then games are 
potentially different. Today, though, WIPO’s research has pointed to a good deal of variation 
between state approaches to games, and the industry has been able to benefit from both forms 
of protection. In particular, regulating games under the Information Society Directive has 
emerged as the preference in the EU, following PC Box.86 O’Donnell’s ethnographic study of 
game developers emphasised the need to study the industry as comprising more than software 
alone, especially in light of the move from engineering-led to interdisciplinary working 
practices, and the significance of providing for a user experience.87 
These points may also lead to a position whereby it is held that a game is acquired in 
the same fashion as other cultural goods (and services) are.88 This might well be the 
consequence of UsedSoft,89 although it is perhaps a moving target when it comes to post-sale 
legal relationships, given changes in more established markets (for example, books as 
compared with ebooks). Furthermore, the evolving position of ‘digital content’ under 
consumer law (for example, as a new third category alongside goods and services in the 
UK)90 should be noted because it attributes a certain distinctiveness to games, not in their 
own right but alongside other digital content, with consequential changes in emphasis or 
expectation. 
 
B. Game-specific 
 
A second position is that a game is sui generis, akin to software and databases. An 
illustrative approach is that of Rendas,91 who criticised the PC Box92 decision by contending 
that video game software ‘controls the different audiovisual elements and makes it possible 
for the user to interact with these elements’. As such, he argued, the ‘attractiveness and very 
operation of videogames’ depended on the said software.93 Although put in game-specific 
terms, a link could be drawn between this software-focused account of games and the 
growing interest in the legal status of computer code and algorithms.94 Furthermore, 
approaches to copyright where the legal position is unclear or favourable (in sectors such as 
fonts, recipes, comedy and databases in the US) demonstrate both the significance of norms 
and the practical utility of non-copyright forms of IP protection in providing a partial 
response to difficulties.95 It could however also be argued that the position of some doubters 
of UsedSoft (ie, using PC Box to argue that games should be dealt with under the Information 
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Society Directive) might also support a game-specific reading of the law because of how they 
point to the ‘complexity’ of the video game.96 
These positions also invite a more nuanced response to the phenomenon of cloning, 
even if agreement is still some distance away. Lee has argued that the concern that protecting 
gameplay stifles creativity can be addressed through balancing tests.97 However, there was 
little agreement among those we spoke to (at our workshop) on what those tests should be. 
Scherlis highlights the phenomenon of those who ‘copy innovative games, while changing 
artwork, text, and titles just enough to avoid infringing copyright law’.98 There might well be 
similarities in other fields (eg, selling unauthorised merchandise or taking advantage of fame 
and the nature of user behaviour through ‘chart hijacking’99). but not to the same extent. 
Therefore this is emerging as a game-specific problem — which would be much easier solved 
in a game-focused copyright system (or not, if that were the preference). 
One might also wilfully blur the lines between copyright, trade mark and non-
harmonized doctrines (eg, passing off) in a sui generis IP or quasi-IP system in order to 
address cloning and/or for other purposes. This issue took on greater significance at an earlier 
stage of the development of the software industry, but recent controversies highlight its 
significance. The initial dilemma was whether copyright or patent law offered the most 
appropriate protection to software. In the US, major players had limited success in meeting 
the tests of patent law, but were concerned that the then-applicable requirements of copyright 
law (deposit of human readable code with the Copyright Office) would destroy competitive 
advantage.100 Even then, firms pursued hybrid approaches, such as trade secrets, licensing, 
and copyright in ancillary materials such as manuals.101 WIPO’s work on model provisions 
for software were ‘inspired by copyright’ but with some elements of patent law, but were 
sidelines after the United States incorporated software into copyright law in 1980.102 Indeed, 
the approach taken in the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV)103 has much to commend it, because of how the broad principles of patent law 
were adapted (through, for instance, narrowing the scope of protection). The specific 
treatment of geographical indications of origin under TRIPS is also interesting, not just 
because of the choice between the means of protection (also present for plant varieties, where 
signatories can follow UPOV or use patent law), but also because of the a two-tier approach 
(which offers specific and stronger protection in respect of wines and spirits),104 which 
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recognises the advantages of a pragmatic approach. Of course, any regime for games would 
need to be adapted to the specific features of the sector. 
 
 
Even in the absence of a sui generis approach, tensions can be identified in how 
models and metaphors are chosen. In relation to games, particular flashpoints are around the 
application of the merger and scènes à faire doctrines. Moon argues that the tests used by 
courts (for merger in particular) are not capable of application to software because of the 
functional nature of software.105 In Navitaire, the idea of using the ‘plot of a novel’ as a 
relevant comparator was greatly criticised;106 this point was quoted at length in Nova 
Productions in the High Court, and approved (albeit the subject of a brief interlude on chefs 
and recipes) in the Court of Appeal.107 (This was however still an important theme in our 
discussions with developers, who feared that a strong legal approach would lead to the 
commodification or monopolization of genre.108) In the earlier US cases on arcade games, 
courts grappled with how to apply established precedents (notably a piece of jewellery — a 
pin — in the shape of a bee109), finding relevance but less obviousness for games.110 In the 
more recent Tetris decision,111 the Court drew heavily on cases and arguments regarding 
board games. Of course, the PC Box decision saw manufacturers play up the non-software 
aspects of games in order to ensure protection of their business model through the application 
of TPM law.112 
 
C. Player rights 
 
I contend that there is also a player-focused account of copyright, which is less 
concerned with the status of the game and more exercised regarding the instrumental use of 
copyright in support of particular business and organizational models. The game is not just a 
work but also provides an infrastructure for subsequent creativity, transactions and 
exchanges. 
The freemium business model (offering the game for free and charging for additional 
features through in-game or in-app purchases) is compelling for some but it has highlighted a 
significant, non-copyright area of legal relationships between developers and users.113 For 
example, the Office of Fair Trading began a project on ‘Children’s Online Games’ in 2013,114 
resulting in a final set of ‘principles for online and app-based games’115 which explained the 
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application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive116 to these games. In 2013, national 
consumer protection authorities in the European Union, acting through the Consumer 
Protection Cooperation (‘CPC’) network,117 reached a common position on EU law and in-
app purchases in ‘games apps’.118 
The relationship between platform and player is acknowledged as contractual in 
nature (with an inherent inequality of bargaining power). The PC Box decision would be 
criticized under this approach on the grounds that its distinction between fundamental rights 
and user rights is unsound. In the US (games) decision of MDY Industries,119 limits were 
placed on the use of copyright law to achieve other goals. In the EU, national reviews of 
copyright law have also pointed to the need to avoid allowing the statutory rights of users to 
be overridden by ‘agreement’ between a user and a platform.120 This is already the case for 
certain rights, such as the exception for decompiling contained in article 8 of the Software 
Directive and in similar provisions elsewhere.121 
A player rights model of game copyright law also entails significant reservations on 
the use of DRM. A very limited form of this is seen in the new provisions of the Consumer 
Rights Directive,122 which require disclosure of limits to functionality (including TPMs) and 
interoperability; Guibault proposed (before the Directive) that this could form one part of a 
consumer law strategy to counter the over-use of contractual restrictions, but only alongside 
substantive protections and/or changes to the doctrine of contract law itself.123 In Australia, 
consumer protection authorities participated as a friend of the court in the Sony v Stevens 
DRM case.124 Developments of this nature illustrate how a response outside of copyright law 
is a part of the evolving status of games. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter, and the attempt to summarize a broad range of 
perspectives in the three models set out immediately above, does not present a complete 
picture of the legal issues in the games sector. Nonetheless, it has been shown that as a result 
of the lack of clarity regarding the role that copyright plays in respect of games, unpacking 
cases and critical perspectives can demonstrate the significance of certain assumptions and 
definitions. 
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I do not mean to suggest that arguably arcane doctrinal disputes would seize the 
attention of lawmakers. However, copyright legislation drafted anew in respect of the second 
and third model could look rather different to what is currently in place. Moreover, even the 
first model is an interpretation of and a particular approach to current legislation, rather than a 
mere encapsulation of the status quo. The difficulty for any imagined lawmaker responding to 
the ‘needs’ of the games sector is that the economic and cultural interests of different groups 
would be affected by the choice of one path or another. Put simply, aspects of business 
models and commercial strategies in the games industries are built around understandings of 
what the law does (and does not) protect. The intention of this author, and indeed one of the 
goals of our broader project, has been to identify these relationships in more explicit terms. 
 
 
